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These are hard times for the Common Agricultural Policy  (CAP)  of  the  European
Community  (EC).  Domestically the CAP is  under strong pressure, originating
mainly from the heavy burden it  creates for the Community budget.  Part of
this  burden could be relieved if  ways could be found by  which  certain  imports
of agricultural products, which add to surpluses on  EC  markets,  could  be
redressed and if  the Community's agricultural exports could  be  made  less
costly.  However, there is  considerable international pressure on the CAP as
well, which makes it  difficult to adopt these saving measures.  It  is
particularly the United States which, after having treated the EC rather
leniently for two decades, seems to have lost patience and begun to zero in  on
the CAP.
It  is  both fascinating and awkward to discuss the Community's  agricultural
trade policy in  such times.  Much can be said about this  topic,  but most  of  it
has already been said highly competently by many observers.  And,  it  may  be
difficult  to  see  the  forest  of  basic  problems  for  trees  of  current  issues.
Why not start with a  naive question:  Does the European Community have an
agricultural trade policy at all?  Following this appetizer  (presented  in
section 1)  we may continue, for hors d'oeuvre, with looking a  bit into the
orchestration of measures and arrangements affecting the Community's
agricultural trade (section 2).  After having, then, in  section 3,  gotten a
taste of the effects of the CAP on international market relationships we may
still not feel satisfied and choose, for a  somewhat more  substantial  course,
to deal with the impact of the EC's agricultural trade  on  world  market
instability.
One warning seems in  place right at the beginning.  The  author  of  the  present
paper does not happen to belong to those Europeans who tend to defend  the CAP
against most external  (and, indeed, internal) criticism.  For a  meeting which
aims at a  comparative view of North American and European policies it  might
have proved more stimulating and rewarding to invite somebody who fully
supports the CAP.  The present author would not make a  good advocatus diaboli.
The External Face of the CAP:  Trade without Policy?  It  may appear to be
nonsense to ask whether the Community has an agricultural trade policy at
all.  On the face of  it, all  ingredients of an agricultural trade policy are
there in  the CAP.  A  host of measures affecting agricultural imports and
exports is  perfectly applied;  in  the  framework of  international institutions,
above all the GATT, EC officials are engaged in  agricultural trade
negotiations; and  the Community is  party to a  number of bilateral and
multilateral agreements concerning agricultural trade.  What else is  required
for an  agricultural trade policy?
What  would  be  required  for  a  bundle  of  measures  that deserved  to  be  called  a
policy  would  be  a  concept  behind  all  this,  a  considered  approach,  a  defined
strategy.  This would not necessarily have to be a  highly consistent approach
or a  carefully directed strategy, let alone a  theoretically sound concept
which  an  economist  might  dream of.  It  would  suffice  that policymakers  have
some  idea,  however,  vague,  of  why  and  how  they  want  to  influence  matters.
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that  central variables in  the domain considered  are viewed, theoretically
speaking, as elements of  the objective  function by  policymakers.  Thus,  the
existence  of an agricultural  trade  policy would require  that  those  responsible
for running  the policy  take some interest in  how  agricultural  trade  flows  and
international market conditions develop.  It  is  exactly the failure of the
Community's  agricultural policymakers to take this interest  which  raises
doubts  as to whether  the Community has an agricultural  trade  policy  at all.
Outside  observers of the CAP have often inferred that  one,  if  not  the  main,
objective  of  this policy  is  to  make  the  Community  self-sufficient  in  food.
The high level of CAP price support has been attributed  to  this  objective.  If
this  were  a  true description  of  European  reality,  the  Community  would  in  fact
have an agricultural trade policy, though a  rather degenerate and
self-defeating one.  The Community would in  this case take an interest in  its
agricultural  trade, the special interest being that it  does  not  want  to  have
this trade.  However, self-sufficiency in  food has never really been an
objective  of the CAP, though on occasions it  has been  used  as  a  pretext  by
those lobbying for higher price support.  This is  best demonstrated by the
fact that the Community, which originally was  a  net  importer of most
agricultural products and then experienced a  steadily growing degree of
self-sufficiency, has not really switched to less generous price support, once
it  had become self-sufficient in  individual products.  The  milk-market  regime
did not change when the EC grew into a  significant net exporter of dairy
products,  in  the sugar-market regime the maximum quota  for  production  covered
by price guarantee has been set at around 120 percent of domestic EC
consumption, for grains  the "production target"  as proposed  by  the  Commission,
and tentatively agreed by the Council, has been pitched such that net exports
from the Community  are implied, to give  only a  few examples.  The  degree  to
which the CAP has become more cautious since the EC has emerged as a  major
agricultural exporter is  due not to trade (or rather nontrade,  that  is,
self-sufficiency) considerations but to the financial problems  exports have
caused for the Community budget.
If  self-sufficiency  has  not  really  been  an  objective  of  the  CAP,  there  may
have been other strategies for agricultural trade in  the Community.  However,
it  is  hard to detect any.  It  has been stated countless times and has to be
repeated here--measures affecting agricultural trade of  the Community are
essentially nothing more than adjuncts of an agricultural policy which is
obsessed with domestic problems.  A  statement of  this type has a  certain
validity for most countries'  agricultural  "trade" policies.  Agricultural
policies  in  general have often been described as  attempts at  exporting
domestic problems, in  particular, adjustment pressure on farmers  and
agricultural market  instability, to other countries. 1/  Yet, the degree to
which  this  applies  to  individual  countries  differs.  In  the  EC  the
predominance of domestic issues over trade considerations is  particularly
pronounced.
1/  See for example, T.  Josling,  "International Policies and Programs."
In:  E.  O.  Heady and L.  R.  Whitting (eds.), Externalities in  the
Transformation of Agriculture: Distribution of Benefits and Costs  from
Development,  Ames,  Iowa,  1975;  and  S.  Tangermann,  "Hindernisse und  Aussichten
auf  dem  Wege  zu  einer  internationalen Agrarpolitik,"  Quarterly Journal  of
International Agriculture, Heft 2,  1982.
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agricultural importer.  Importers are often more inward looking.  Moreover,
though the domestic and  international effects  of protection do,  in  principle,
not depend on the net trade position of the country concerned,  importers  are
usually more easily forgiven for a  certain degree of protectionism than
exporters.  However, though still  importing agricultural products in  large
quantities, the EC has meanwhile become a significant  agricultural  exporter,
in  particular in  many products  to which market regimes apply, that is,  those
products which are covered by the CAP.  Hence, one might expect that the
Community meanwhile takes an interest in  world-market developments and  tries,
at least on  its export  side,  to exert a  deliberate influence on trade  flows.
But, this is  hardly the case.
There are many indications which support this view.  A few examples must
suffice here.  In the Community there are only vague  ideas  about  how
international markets for agricultural produce operate.  What  one  knows  about
them is  that prices are distorted.  This is  taken to imply that they are
meaningless  for  Community  policies.  A minister  for  agriculture  of  one  of  the
EC member countries is  known for arguing:  "There is  nothing  like  a  world
market price.  I  have never met anybody who could explain to me what a  world
market price is. We cannot orientate our policy by  world  market  prices."  It
seems never to have occurred to this high-level politician that the world-
market price is  simply the price at which the Community  has  to  import  and
export agricultural products and that this  implies  that  it  is  a  very  important
criterion for policy decisions.
This detachment from the  international trade scene also means that there is,
at  least among policymakers, bureaucrats, and farmers,  very little information
on the actual world-market  situation.  Very little is  done  by  way  of  providing
outlook on world market developments  and gaining insights  into prospects  for
individual products.  While, for example, in  North America  and  Oceania  outlook
conferences are  important events on the agricultural calendar and considerable
research is  devoted to prospects on world markets, activities  like this are
close to  nonexistent in  the Community.  In  discussions  on  agricultural  policy
matters  it  occasionally happens  that a farmer  springs  to  his  feet  and  cries:
"If  only the Government would  set our prices  free, then our earnings could
eventually increase."
The  failure  to  understand  the  significance  of  international  trade  per  se  is
particularly frustrating when it  comes to dairy products where Community
exports hold some 40 to  60 percent of  the World market, which means that the
Community should really look at the international scene very carefully.  For
example,  the EC surplus situation is  often evaluated in  the press,  and one
feels sometimes also among policymakers, not in  terms of quantities  to be
exported but in  terms of the level of  intervention stocks.  When the "butter
mountain"  in  intervention has happened to come down for a  while, because of
heavy  export  subsidization,  the  press  reports that "the butter surplus  has
disappeared,"  and many people get the impression that the problem has been
solved.  Farmers'  unions,  noting  that the  Community  has  a  high  share  in  world
exports  of dairy products, have occasionally requested the Commission to use
its  "market power"  and  export  at higher prices,  ignoring  that this  would  be
possible  only  if  the  Community  would  cutback  its  exports  and,  hence,  its milk
production.
If  trade as  such  is  not  a  significant  variable  for  agricultural policymaking
in  the Community, it  still exerts an indirect,  though highly effective,
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nature of this  influence is appreciated.  Again, the dairy sector provides a
striking example.  World-market prices for dairy products have been unusually
high since 1980.  This has allowed major savings  in export restitutions for
dairy products which have relieved the pressure on the Community budget
considerably in 1980,  1981,  and, to a lesser degree,  in 1982.  In the
Community, essentially only this budget effect has attracted attention.  It
was a very significant factor in turning away from the "prudent" price policy
of the  late seventies and in silencing debates about CAP reform which had
become heated before, because of the danger that Community spending could hit
the budget ceiling soon. 2/  However, there is little awareness of the fact
that this was due mainly to a very special situation on world markets.
It would be overambitious to try and explain this  lack of a proper
agricultural trade policy in the Community in few words.  Some of the member
countries take a strong  interest in agricultural trade.  This is particularly
true for the export-oriented countries,  like France, the Netherlands, Denmark,
and Ireland.  For these countries, agricultural exports constitute a major
item in their balance of payments.  However, this statement contains already
one of the major clues for explaining  the Community's attitudes,  vis-a-vis
agricultural trade.  For individual member countries their agricultural trade
may be very important.  But, this  is  in any case both intra-Community trade
and trade with third countries, about which an individual member country is
essentially indifferent because the system of Community financing means that
what an individual member country earns  from agricultural exports or pays for
agricultural imports  is  independent of whether it trades with other member
countries or with the rest of the world.  In economic terms this says that the
shadow price of agricultural products for an individual member country is  in
any case (close to)  the domestic Community price 3/ rather than the world
market price.
If world-market prices have so  little influence on individual member
countries' well-being it is no wonder that nobody takes a keen interest in
them.  Yet, for the Community as a whole, world markets are very decisive.
Agricultural trade of  the Community with third countries comes, therefore,
close to what could be called a public good  for the  individual member
country.  The theory of public goods has  long ago explained why governments
have to supply these goods.  However, in the Community there  is no Government
in this  sense.  Major decisions are essentially taken in the Council of
Ministers.  The Council  is a meeting place of national  interests, but not a
supernational government.  Hence,  it  is  little wonder that the public good,
"interest in the Community's agricultural trade with third countries,"  is
scarcely supplied  in the Community.
2/  See, for example, S.  Tangermann, "Financial Pressure on the European
Community and  its Consequences for the Future of the Common Agricultural
Policy,"  paper prepared for delivery at the 1982 Annual Conference of the
Agricultural Economics  Society of Ireland, Dublin, October 29,  1982 (to be
published).
3/  The actual shadow price is  somewhat below the Community price, the
difference being the share of the member country in the Community budget for
import levies or export restitutions.  See,  for example, U. Koester,
"EG-Agrarpolitik in der Sackgasse," Divergierende nationale Interessen bei der
Verwirklichung der EWG-Agrarpolitik, Baden-Baden, 1977.
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traditionally been attributed to agricultural trade we have to recognize that
recently things seem to be changing.  The Community considers,  and has  in part
already concluded, agreements regarding its  imports of grain substitutes,  and
the notion of an "active export policy" and of "long-term export contracts"
start playing a role  in the CAP.  These sound like first steps toward the
development of an agricultural trade strategy.  However, it has very much to
do with the orchestration of trade measures under the CAP.  The matter is,
therefore, best deferred to the next section.
Instruments and Noninstruments  Arrangements  and Nonarranements
Those who would argue that the Community does have an agricultural trade
policy could point at the Community's  very intensive use of  instruments
affecting agricultural trade.  It  is,  in  particular, the variable import levy
and export restitution system for which the CAP has become notorious, although
there are many more countries  in the world that use instruments or measures
which essentially function in the same way as variable  levies and
restitutions.  There is no doubt that these  instruments and other measures,
applied under the CAP, have a significant influence on the Community's
agricultural trade.  However, by their very nature they are domestic, rather
than trade-oriented, measures and, therefore, a sign that the Community does
not have a trade policy.
Consider the difference between a tariff or an import quota on the one hand
and a variable levy on the other.  Policymakers deciding on a tariff or a
quota explicitly decide to control trade.  When making this decision they are
forced to think about trade flows and may, also, be led to think about how
their trade partners are affected.  Variable import levies,  on the other hand,
are not, as such, decided upon at the political level.  It  is the threshold
price which is politically determined.  The actual  levy applying  in any
particular moment is, then, in a purely technical manner calculated as the
difference between the  threshold and the world-market price.  This separation
between the decision on the threshold price and the levy calculation tends to
make policymakers  forget that they effectively decide on trade measures when
they fix prices.  It is,  therefore,  little wonder that the EC Council of
Ministers for Agriculture in its  annual price review considers various
domestic variables, above all obviously the  farm-income situation and,
recently, budget availability, but does not seem to reflect upon the way in
which its decisions impinge on trade.
While this general aspect may be of only academic interest,  the purely
domestic nature of the CAP's specific instrumentation has had at  least one
decisive practical consequence for the Community's relations with its
agricultural trade partners.  In all international negotiations about possible
limitations or reductions of barriers against agricultural trade, the
Community's partners found it  difficult, if  not impossible, to extract any
concessions from the Community because the EC negotiators adamantly claimed
that they were not in  a  position to put domestic policies on the negotiating
table.  In a  way, they were and are right.  A tariff or a  quota is  open to
negotiation.  It  can be bound or relaxed.  And, there is  at least no technical
difficulty to adhere to a  committment once it  has been made.  But, how could
an EC negotiator commit the Community to, say, bind certain import levies or
export restitution?  This would be completely outside the basic system of the
CAP.
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for given commodities.  Some countries have tried to convince the Community it
should enter into such agreements.  What would happen  if  world-market  prices
dropped below a  level which the EC could not, at given CAP intervention
prices, reach by help of the maximum export restitutions?  Either  intervention
stocks in  the Community would have to grow infinitely, which would be
financially, and at some stage even physically, infeasible.  Or,  the Community
would have to drop the idea of fixed  intervention prices and let domestic
prices go down in  parallel with world-market prices.  In  this latter case, the
whole concept of price fixing by the Council of Ministers  during the  annual
price reviews would become obsolete.  In  European terms  it  would  be  completely
unthinkable  that  the  Council would be deprived of  its  right  to  fix
agricultural support prices.  Thus, it  is  only logical if  EC representatives
in international  negotiations  claim there is  nothing  to negotiate  about.
Even in  less basic cases the EC is  in  great difficulties.  The  Community  has
been accused of violating the GATT code on export subsidies  according  to  which
no country should attract more than an equitable share of the world market.
In  the short run, and--considering  domestic, political restrictions against
abrupt CAP adjustments--also  in  the medium run, there  is  basically  little the
Community can, within its given system, do  if  its  exports  happen  to  grow  out
of proportion with the world market.  Whatever is  supplied  to  intervention
agencies has to be acquired  and, at some stage, must be exported.
Looking  somewhat more into the details of administering the market regimes,
however, one detects more flexibility than this basic textbook analysis would
appear to suggest.  This is  at least true as  far as  controlling  exports  in  the
short run is  concerned.  While determining  import levies by calculating the
difference between the threshold price and the lowest offer price for imports
is  relatively straightforward and does not leave much room for manipulation,
setting export restitutions is  very much a  business of  discretionary  ad  hoc
decisions.  Contrary to the case of import levies there is  no formula
according to which export restitutions would have to  be  fixed.  In  the
regulations establishing the market regimes for individual products, a  number
of loose criteria for fixing restitutions is  set out, like world market
prices,  the market situation in  the Community, and market prospects.  However,
as there  is  no formal rule for computing restitutions, the management
committees, which are in  charge of determining restitutions, have remarkable
room for maneuver.  This has  at least  two significant consequences.
First, the amount the Community exports in  any given period is  rather
unpredictable.  If  the management committee responsible for dairy products,
for example, decides that the current butter surplus should,  for the time
being, be taken on stock rather than exported, it  sets export restitutions at
such  a  low  level  that  selling  into  intervention  appears  more  profitable  for
the  private trade than  exporting.  It  is  difficult  to  find  out  on  what  sort  of
criteria the  management  committees  base  these  decisions.  They  may  be
speculating against the world market on occasions, though not necessarily very
successfully.  But, they have certainly other criteria in  mind as well, which
may not at all have to do with the international market situation.  For
example, intervention buying is  cheaper for the Community budget, in  a  given
moment, than exporting because the Community budget bears only the storage
cost, while national exchequers have to finance the value of  the commodity on
stock.  As the pure storage cost is  usually less than the restitution required
for  export,  the  management  committees  can  buy  time  for  the  Community  budget  by
intervening now and exporting later.  Thus,  should the budget look scarce this
128year but budget prospects are better for next year, exports can be shifted to
next year and vice versa.
Second, the Community can capture any third-country market at any time for its
exports if  it  so desires because export restitutions can be fixed such that
any competitor is  pushed out of business  in  this market.  This  (implicit)
possibility of deliberate discrimination between different destinations for EC
exports  is  potentially highly detrimental  for competing exporters as it
enables  the Community  to destroy  traditional  trade relations and marketing
channels which, to establish, may have required considerable efforts.
Discrimination is  made the easier because most products, export restitutions
may officially be differentiated among a  number of regions of destination,
notionally because of differing transport costs.
It  is  in  this context that the notion of an "active export policy," advanced
by some export-oriented member countries, above all France, has to be seen.
Though it  is  not completely clear what this relatively recent addition to  the
CAP jargon is  meant to say it  appears that its proponents would like  to  see
exports being given preference over intervention buying in  general.  Means  for
achieving this could be subsidized export credits, Government support for
marketing,  etc.  Above all, however, an "active export policy" is  probably
thought to entail fixing comparatively high export  restitutions  such  that  the
effective  market  price  in  the  Community,  which  for  surplus  commodities  now
tends to stick to the intervention price  level, is  eventually  raised  above
this  level.
It  is  questionable whether administering market regimes in  this way would
already qualify for being called a  trade policy.  However, closer to a  real
trade policy would come what currently is  discussed in  the Community under the
heading of "long  term export contracts".  Here again, it  is  not completely
clear what the commission really had in  mind when it,  also pushed particularly
from the French side, proposed this additional instrument for the CAP.
Technically, these  contracts would probably be similar to  those which, for
example, the United States has made with the Soviet Union and China regarding
U.S. grain exports to  these countries.  However, like in  these cases,  the
economic  significance of such  contracts would remain somewhat clouded as  long
as  their provisions with regard to quantities and prices would retain the
unavoidable degree  of indefiniteness and even escape clauses.  Of course, it
can be argued that long-term export contracts at least provide a  certain
guarantee of access to markets and that they establish an opportunity for
better contro.l  of export flows in  order to  avoid undesired events  like the
"great grain robbery."  However, in  the case of  the Community both aspects
would not really appear to be decisive.  Given its variable export
restitutions the Community will always find it  possible to  "create" access to
markets on an ad hoc basis.  And, the CAP market regimes provide means of
monitoring trade flows closely.
It  is  difficult  to  stifle  the  suspicion  that those  lobbying  for  long-term
export  contracts  in  the  EC  want  to  take pressure  off  the  CAP.  Once  the
Community has entered into such contracts, they may hope, export quantities
covered by them will politically no longer be regarded as annoying surpluses.
After all the Community is,  then, obliged to supply these quantities.
Moreover, it  may be possible to take export restitutions related to quantities
under contract out of the CAP part of the budget and hide them somewhere else
in  the Community budget.  Similar attempts continue to be made by interested
parties with regard to expenditure related to other items,  like the sugar
129agreement under the Lome Convention, the agreement regarding butter imports
from New Zealand, etc.
In any case, long-term export contracts could become a new feature in the
CAP's external face, though not necesarily a positive one.  A new feature
which is already there  is restrictions on imports of grain substitutes.  The
Community and Thailand have recently ratified a "voluntary" self-restraint
agreement regarding Thai manioc exports to the EC.  Negotiations with
Indonesia and other GATT members have  led to the tariff on manioc imports  from
these countries for quantities above a given ceiling  (tariff quota).  The
Commission would, also, like to enter into negotiations with the United States
on a similar type of agreement regarding U.S. corn gluten feed exports to the
Community.  The United States,  however, has so far strictly declined to  even
consider such negotiations.
An evaluation of the Community's  actual and potential policy on grain
substitutes  is  less easy than  it might appear on the face of it.  At the first
glance the exporters, subject  to quantitative restrictions, appear to lose.
However, this  is not necessarily the case.  The EC import demand for grain
substitutes  is probably highly price inelastic at prices below those
equivalent to domestic EC grain prices.  The revenue from sales of grain
substitutes  on the EC market  is, therefore  likely to increase if  supplies are
reduced such that substitute prices approach the equivalent of the EC
grain-price level,  Whether or not exporters benefit from this depends on
whether the quantity restrictions are administered such that exporting
countries can attract the rents resulting from the restrictions.  Under
self-restraint on the side of the exporters it  is  very likely that rents
remain with the exporting countries.  If  only individual exporters impose
self-restraints, however, the size of their rents is,  also, determined by
supply elasticities of their competitors and by the elasticity of  substitution
between their export commodity and other grain substitutes.  Moreover, it
depends on whether or not the EC imposes restrictions on imports  of grain
substitutes  from these competitors too.  Hence, the case is  not at all
clear-cut.
Whether the United States would really lose from a  restraint on their exports
of corn gluten feed  is even less sure.  In addition, to the aspect discussed
above, one has to consider that fewer  imports of grain substitutes into the
Community would mean, to a certain extent, more grain (and soybean) imports
and/or less grain exports of  the EC.  The United States, being the dominant
grain and soybean exporter, would necessarily benefit on that score.
Looked at from the Community's point of view, an evaluation of different
options for policy on grain substitutes is  equally difficult.  The main
political motivation for restrictions on imports of grain substitutes is to
save budget expenditure on export restitutions for grains.  In this sense,
import restrictions for grain substitutes would certainly be effective.
Moreover, they may have positive welfare effects as the theory of the second
best teaches that distortions of the use of goods are minimized if nominal
rates of protection are equalized across commodities.  Hence, grain
substitutes would have to be made subject to the same relative import duties
as grains. A/  However, restrictions on imports of grain substitutes which are
designed such that exporters attract the rents would not have the potential
4/  One would, however, also have to consider how this changes effective
protection of the goods produced out of grain and grain substitutes.
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second best is academic  if not naive insofar as it overlooks  that the adoption
of a second best solution is  likely to counteract forces which otherwise might
lead to approaching the first best solution.  In the  case  of  the  CAP  this
means that adoption of restrictions on substitute imports will reduce the
budget pressure which otherwise could have led to a  lower  level  of
agricultural protection in  general.
But, this, again, is  not necessarily clear.  The EC commission has tried, in
appropriate proposals, to establish a  link between restrictions on substitute
imports  and its objective of adjusting EC grain prices  gradually  to  the  level
of domestic grain prices  in  the United States.  It  is  difficult  to  imagine
that it  will be successful in  convincing the council that it  should adhere to
this  link.  The council may agree on further restrictions on substitute
imports but refuse to adjust EC grain prices to the U.S.  level.
This opens up an interesting opportunity for U.S. negotiators  which,  it  seems,
should be seriously considered.  The United States and  the EC could agree on a
quid pro quo deal.  The United States could promise to  impose  a  self-restraint
on its  exports of corn gluten feed if  and when the EC commits itself to
adjusting its grain prices to the U.S. level in  a  given period.  Leaving the
uncertain welfare effects with regard to corn gluten feed aside, the United
States should have a  strong long-run interest in  lower  prices  in  the
Community.  EC agricultural policymakers,  on the other  hand,  will hardly  be
inclined to adjust domestic grain prices downward unless  this  solves  an
acutely pressing  problem.  Grain  substitutes  are  a  problem  for  the  Community.
Cooperation of the United States in  solving this  problem  may  be  an  incentive
for the council to accept the commission's proposals for lower EC grain prices.
Solutions like this could potentially lead the Community along the way toward
a  proper agricultural trade policy.  The instrumentation and  the  philosophy  of
the CAP would no longer be exclusively domestically oriented  but  would  take
relationships between the Community and  international markets  into  account.
World Market Forces and the CAP.  Listening to  some CAP officials one could
believe that the Community pursues one of  the most liberal and open
agricultural trade policies.  They point out  that the Community is  the  largest
agricultural importer in  the world and that  its agricultural  imports have
grown considerably in  the past.  However, it  is  easy to  show that  statements
of this type are essentially a  misuse of  statistics.
Apart  from  (some  types  of)  fruits  and  vegetables  the  Community  is  meanwhile
self-sufficient  or  producing  surpluses  in  essentially  all  major products
covered by the CAP.  Remaining net imports  are,  first, in  those commodities
which  could  be  produced  in  the  Community  only  at prohibitively  high  cost  or
not at all, such as tea, coffee, cocoa, tropical fruits, etc.  Second, the
Community has remained a  large net  importer of oilseed and protein feed.
Historically, these commodities, also, were too costly to produce in  Europe,
hence, they were viewed as agricultural inputs or noncompeting outputs,  low
prices  for  which  were  either beneficial  or  irrelevant  for  European  farmers.
EC  policymakers,  therefore,  had  few  difficulties  in agreeing  to  bind tariffs
for these products to zero or low levels.  Consequently, imports of these
commodities kept growing at relatively high rates.  Meanwhile, new production
technologies, geographical expansion of the Community, and changing market
conditions have tended to  increase the capacity and attractiveness of
producing  these  commodities  in  the  Community  and  one  needs  not  be  a  prophet  to
131predict that conflicts between the Community and its  traditional suppliers are
on the cards.  However, for the time being these types of commodities are more
or less the only ones where the Community can claim, with a  certain
justification, that it  pursues a  relatively liberal policy, potentially
against the  interests of  its own producers,
Apart from these product categories in  which the Community has remained a  net
importer there are commodities  of which the Community produces a surplus, but
continues to  import (in  gross terms) considerable amounts.  Those imports, of
course, add to the high agricultural  import bill of the Community.  Apart from
cases of product differentiation resulting in  "intra-industry" trade, as in
the case of wheat where the Community exports low and  imports high qualities,
these gross  imports are to a  significant  extent due to trade preferences which
the Community has granted to third countries.  Famous examples are  imports of
sugar and beef from African, Pacific, and Caribbean countries under the Lome
Convention and butter imports  from New Zealand.  In  all of  these cases the
Community has failed to adjust its domestic production to the preferential
imports.  It  is  rather, producing  surpluses already on the domestic market,
such that preferentially treated imports  simply add to the quantities which
the Community exports.  In the case of sugar, for example, the Community
produces around 2  million tons  (about 20 percent of domestic  consumption) more
than it  consumes, while at the same time it  imports  1.3 million tons  (at
guaranteed domestic EC prices) from developing countries under the Lome
Convention, which means that it  exports around 3.3 million tons.  Gross
imports  of this type are certainly not a  valid  indication of  the Community's
"liberal"  agricultural trade policy.
The growing surplus production in  the Community tends to be viewed,  inside and
outside the EC, as a  consequence of CAP price support.  There is  no doubt  that
this is  a correct interpretation in  the sense that EC  surpluses would be lower
(or EC imports higher) if  protection of agriculture in  the Community would be
reduced.  However, as  long  as one is  talking about a  growing  surplus,  that is,
a change of the market situation over time, one should consider to what extent
a change of price support can be made responsible for a  change in  the
surplus.  In  this dynamic  sense the analysis  is  much less  trivial.
In the EC,  relatively little research is  done regarding the quantitative
effects of the CAP on the Community's  agricultural trade.  The present author
is  not aware of  any study which has tried, on a  commodity-by-commodity basis,
taking inter-commodity relations  into  account, to establish time series of the
trade effects of  the CAP.  Hence, by implication, we seem to be, also,  lacking
knowledge regarding the effects of the CAP on worldwide trade flows and
international price levels.  Thus,  only a  few speculations will be offered
here.
The CAP could be said to have led to growing distortions of  international
trade if  protection of EC agriculture, vis-a-vis world markets, had increased
over time.  A  thorough analysis of  this question would have to start from a
time series of rates of protection, both effective and nominal, taking all
domestic and trade related measures of  the CAP into account.  As such a time
series is  not easily available, a  much simpler indicator has to be used here;
that is,  the ratio between EC entry prices (inclusive of  import levies) and
world market prices, costs,  insurance, and freight at the EC border.  There 'is
132no doubt that this  is a very inadequate measure of the degree of protection,
but given that domestic subsidies are not too  important under the CAP,  it may
indicate at  least the direction of changes of the  (nominal) rate of protection.
Figures 1 through 4 show the development of  this indicator for four selected
commodities;  that is,  wheat, maize, beef, and butter  (as a proxy for dairy
products in general)  from the early times of the common-market regimes to the
early eighties.  There has obviously been much variability of the price gap
between the EC and the world market, due mainly to fluctuations of
international prices.  CAP prices have been unresponsive to changing world
market conditions.  The consequences for  international instability will be
discussed below.  Here we are interested in the  level of protection.  For the
commodities  included here, CAP protection does,  in general, not seem to have
increased since 1968.  Only in the  case of beef protection does  it seem to
have been slightly higher recently than in the  late sixties.  Even if one
considers  that the price gap between the EC and world markets has recently
been increasing again, it still does,  in general, for the  commodities covered
here not seem to be above that of the late sixties.
Constant levels of protection, however, do not necessarily indicate that the
degree to which the CAP distorts world markets has not changed.  As far as the
distortion of trade flows is  concerned, it  is  the difference between
countries' rates of protection rather than absolute levels of protection which
is decisive.  It could well be that the EC has kept its rate of protection
vis-a-vis the world market, while other countries have lowered their
protection.  In this case, the degree of distortions resulting from the CAP
would have increased.
Again,  it  is not possible here to have recourse to available analyses, and a
rough indicator will have to suffice again.  Shares of  the EC  in aggregate
developed country production and consumption of the commodities  concerned  may
be used as such an indicator.  As long as nonprice influences  on  production
and consumption have not differed too much among countries,  a  growing
protection in the Community, relative to protection in other developed
countries, would show up in an increasing EC share of production and a
decreasing EC share of consumption.  However, from figures 1 to 4 5/, no
discernible trend of EC shares  in the developed-country aggregates emerges.
Again, it  is only in the case of beef that the EC's share of developed country
production seems to have slightly grown in recent years.  Thus,  in general,
one cannot say that the EC has captured a larger share of  developed country
production or that it  has cutback its  consumption in  relative terms.
This would seem to be in  contrast to the EC's  rising surpluses.  But, it  only
says that the EC's  surpluses have roughly grown in  line with the surpluses  i
the developed countries on aggregate.  This is  no excuse for the CAP and it
does not at all say that the EC's dumping of agricultural products is  not
harmful for international trade.  But, it  puts the role of the Community in
5/  For milk only the EC's share in  production is  given, because the wide
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nIperspective.  As in other developed countries, rising surpluses are not
necessarily due to growing levels of protection.  They may simply result  from
rates of technological progress in agriculture which outpace demand growth,
even at declining  real prices for farm products which the Community has
experienced like other countries.
The CAP and World Market Instability:  How Bad Is  the EC?  Since instability
on world markets for agricultural products  and its  relationship with domestic
stabilization policies has attracted the attention of economists it has become
a conventional wisdom that a variable levy system like that of the Community
tends to amplify international price instability because it  takes domestic
agricultural markets  out of the worldwide buffer system.  A  number of
.theoretical  contributions 6/  have made this point very strongly, and some
empirical case studies 7/ have shown, among others, how domestic price
stabilization under the CAP has added to world market  instability during the
crisis of the early seventies.
However,  some more recent contributions 8/ have pointed out that the general
argument is  subject  to a number of qualifications.  If  these  assumptions  are
not fulfilled, the conclusion may change considerably.  First,  instability
transmission between markets depends obviously on whether  or  not  fluctuations
on individual markets are correlated.  Second, most countries'  stabilization
policies include storage as one of their elements, and  stock changes may
counteract or reinforce the instability effects  of the country's trade policy
measures.  Third, domestic markets are not completely stabilized in most
cases.  The remaining scope for domestic adjustments is  bound to affect the
instability linkage with the rest of the world.  Fourth, in markets with
lagged supply response and, therefore, a tendency toward cyclical
fluctuations,  stabilizing domestic prices and, hence, domestic production may
dampen rather than increase international  instability.
6/  See for example, M. D. Bale and E.  Lutz,  "The Effects of Trade
Intervention on International Price Instability,"  American Journal of
Agricultural Economics, Vo.  61,  1979,  pp.  512-515, and P.  Lloyd, "The Effects
of Trade Interventions on International Price Instability and National
Welfare," mimeograph, May 1980.
7/  See for example, T. Heidhues and D  Hollstein, "Anpassungsmethoden
bestimmter Lander oder Landergruppen an wechselnde Knappheitslagen auf den
Weltgetreidemarkten,"  Agrarwirtschaft, Jg. 27  (1978),  S. 144-156, and T.
Josling, Developed-Country Agricultural Policies and Developing-Country
Supplies:  The Case of Wheat.  International Food Policy Research Institute,
Research Report No. 14.  Washington, D.C.,  March 1980.
8/  J. M. DeBois.  "EC Policies and Instability on World Commodity Markets,"
discussion paper, Institute of Agricultural Economics, Gottingen, March 1980;
P. M. Schmitz and U. Koester, "The EC Sugar Market Policy and the Stability of
World Market Prices for Sugar,"  paper presented at the Agricultural Trade
Consortium Meeting, December 1981; J. V. Schrader, "Interdependenzen zwischen
EG-Zuckerpolitik und Preis-oder Mengenschwankungen auf dem Weltmarkt,"
Agrarwirtschaft, Jg.  31  (1982), S. 6-15.
136For each of these qualifications no generalization is  possible.  The way in
which they modify the instability effects of trade policy measures may vary
from case to case.  Only an empirical analysis of the countries and
commodities under consideration can lead  to  conclusions.  Some results of such
an analysis for the case of the EC and the commodities  Wheat, coarse grains,
sugar, and beef will be presented here.  A  few other major countries are
included  for  comparison.
The approach is rather elementary in nature.  Essentially,  it  looks  into
correlations  of various variables' fluctuations  in  order  to  find  out  whether
certain instability links have or have not existed.  Only  quantity  variables
are used, not prices, because after all instability  is  transmitted  between
markets  inside  and  outside  the  Community  via  quantities  only.  Fluctuations
are defined as deviations  from a linear trend.  Observations are annual data
for the period 1968/69 to 1980/81.  Data are mainly from USDA published
statistics.
The analysis starts from the basic identity
(1) Qi  =  Ci  + dli + Ti
where Qi is  production;  Ci,  domestic use;  dli, stock increase;  and Ti,
net exports of the commodity considered for country or region i.  On the
assumption that production is  given for a  given year,  we  are  mainly  interested
to see how domestic use, stock change, and trade react to production
fluctuations  at  home  and  abroad.
Results  are presented in  tables 1  to 6.  The following abbreviations are
used:  "dev X" is  the deviation of variable X from  its  linear  trend;  "m(dev
X)"  is  the  mean  of  absolute  deviations; "ratio"  is  the  value  of  parameter  b  in
the fitted regression;  dev y  = a  + b  dev X  between dev  X and  dev  Y;  "correl"
is  the coefficient  of correlation between dev X  and dev Y;  **  and *  denote
that the  correlation is  significant at the  1-percent or 5-percent level of
significance, respectively.  If  symbols do not carry a country index they
relate  to the  country or region given in  the column head.
Tables 1  and  2  provide a  survey of  the magnitude and the sources of production
instability for the commodities and countries covered here.  Tables 3  to 6
present information concerning instability links between variables (or
instability  absorption).
Wheat production in  the EC is  slightly more stable than in  the United States
and considerably more stable than in  the USSR, both in  absolute and relative
terms  (table 1).  In  the EC,  relative fluctuations of yields are 50-percent
higher than those of acreage, there is  no correlation between yield and
acreage  fluctuations,  and  there  is  no  correlation  between  yield  and  acreage
fluctuations (table 1).  It  is  interesting to note that in  the United States,
acreage  fluctuations  are more  pronounced  than yield  instability  and  that there
is  a  strong negative correlation between acreage and yield fluctuations, which
may  be  due  to  both natural conditions  and  policy  influences.
137Looking at the variability of the absorption variables,  that  is,  the variables
on  the  right-hand  side  of  equation  1,  one  finds  t  t  t  in  th  ,  C  Wheat
consumption is  less stable than in  the rest of the world  (table  2).  However,
this is  no surprise as  in  the rest of  the world many  countries'  fluctuations
may cancel out.  More interesting is  the comparison with individual third
countries which shows that the EC has kept its  consumption much more stable
than both the United States and the USSR.  Stock changes,  too, have been much
lower in  the EC,  both in  absolute terms and relative to total domestic
absorption  (C  +  dl)  (table 3).  Moreover, the Community's net trade has
exhibited  comparative stability,  too  (table 3).
With regard to shifting or sharing the burden of instability between countries
it  is,  firstly, interesting to analyze how countries react to changes of  their
domestic production.  In the case of the EC,  it  is  obvious that production
fluctuations have mainly been absorbed by trade variations.  Both the
coefficient of correlation and the parameter of the regression on domestic
production are highest for trade, lower for stock changes,  and even lower for
consumption in  the EC  (table 3).  This can be taken to say that the EC has
tended, to a  certain extent, to export  its production instability to the rest
of the world.  Of each ton of production above trend the EC has exported 0.41
tons  (table 3).  As there has been a  positive, though low, correlation between
production fluctuations of the EC and those in  the rest of the world (table 1)
this appears to mean that the EC has tended to aggravate  instability in  the
rest of the world.  This could further be indicated by the fact that there has
been a  relatively strong positive correlation between the EC's exports and
exports of the rest of the world (table 3).
Exporting instability of domestic production to the rest of the world could be
called active destabilization of world markets.  In the case of wheat, the EC
appears to have actively destabilized world markets to a certain degree.  On
the other hand, one could define passive destabilization as the  lack of
responsiveness of domestic absorption to  fluctuations of  worldwide
production.  Implicit  in  this  definition  is  the  idea  that a  fair sharing  of
the burden of worldwide instability would require that each country decreases
its domestic absorption (proportionately) if world production decreases and
vice versa.  As far as  domestic consumption  is concerned,  the EC has not
participated in this burdensharing (table 3).  However, stock changes and,
therefore, total domestic absorption in the EC have exhibited a certain
positive correlation with world production (table  3).  Thus, one  cannot say
that the EC has  featured passive destabilization of the rest of the world in
the  case of wheat.
The results  for the remaining commodities will be summarized in  less detail
than for wheat.  Domestic  absorption of  coarse grains  in  the EC was even more
stable than  hat of wheat  (see table 4).  With regard to the absorption of
domestic production fluctuations the EC has, in  the case of coarse grains,
used trade even more, and both consumption and stock changes considerably less
as  a  buffer, than in  the case of wheat.  Thus, active destabilization has been
clearly more pronounced for coarse grains.  On the other hand, there are
nearly no signs of a  fair burdensharing by the EC in  the case of coarse
grains, such that passive destabilization has occurred.
138In  the case of sugar (see table 5)  both active and passive destabilization by
the EC have been even more pronounced than in  the case of  coarse grains.
Deviations of production from trend have been fully reflected in  trade
variations and not at all in  consumption or stock adjustments.  Domestic
absorption in  the EC has not been responsive to changing worldwide scarcities.
In the  case of beef, on the other hand, active destabilization by the EC has
been similar  to the case of coarse grains.  In terms of passive
destabilization, however, the record looks even worse than for sugar as  there
is  a  negative, though not significant, correlation between domestic absorption
in  the EC and world production.
There is  certainly the danger of  over-interpretation of results, like those
presented here.  In particular, it  has to be emphasized that regressions
recorded here must not be interpreted as  depicting causal relationships.
Their only purpose in this case is  to show whether and to what degree certain
variables have moved in parallel.  In a sense this  is  exactly what one would
like to know when one is  interested  in instability links.  However, it  should
be possible to draw some tentative conclusions.
The theoretical hypothesis that the Community's system of variable import
levies and export restitutions tends to destabilize the rest of the world is
not refuted by the empirical evidence presented here.  However, there are
marked differences between commodities.  For wheat, the Community's record
looks  less bad than for coarse grains, and in both sugar and beef the
Community's behavior has been more detrimental for the rest of the world than
in grains.  An explanation of  these commodity differences would require much
closer inspection than has been possible here.  However, at  least for the
different  performance  of  wheat  and  coarse  grains  an  observation  can  be  offered.
In wheat, the Community is  a net exporter.  Intervention buying in order to
remove the surplus production from the domestic market therefore plays  an
important role in the EC wheat economy.  Hence, stock changes tend to reflect
domestic production fluctuations.  Exporting out of stocks, on the other hand,
can,  at least in principle, take the market situation in  the rest of the world
into account.  In coarse grains, however, the Community has a deficit.
Intervention buying, and,  therefore, stock changes play a less important role
than for wheat.  The volume of  imports reacts immediately to domestic
production changes,  independently of the situation in the rest of the world.
Another look at the numbers  in tables 3 and 4 confirms that it  is  essentially
the different behavior of stock changes which entails that wheat is  less bad,
both in terms of active and passive destabilization, than coarse grains,  This
seems to suggest that storage policies have to be given more prominence in
analyses of the instability effects of individual  countries'  agricultural
trade policies.
139Table  I--Variability of grain and sugar production  in  the EC and selected countries,  1968/69 - 1980/81
"  Rest  :.0
Dimension  :  EC  of  :  United  : USSR  :Cuba  :Worl
world  States:tota
Wheat:
Mean deviation  :  Million tons  2.64  14.83  3.13  9.76  - 15.5
Mean  production  :  Million  tons  42.30  330.02  49.41  93.42  --  372.32
Mean  relative  eviaion C  1/21  :  Percent  625j  449  6.4  144  -47
Correlation of deviation  with EC  --  I  .22  .18  .27  -. 39
Ratio of mean rlatrve  deviaeios  of
yield and acreage  --  1.50  1.92  .4345  -18
Correlation  yield-acreage deviation  :  - .00  -. 10  -. 67  .12  --  -.2
Coarse  grains:
Mean  deviation  :  Million  tons  2.55  17.18  12.68  11.80  --  17.2
Mean production  :  Million tons  61.82  593.58  185.92  84.26  --  655.3
Mean relative deviation  C1/21  :Percent  4.12  2.89  6.82  14.00  --  2.6
Correlation of deviation with EC  I  -. 03  .29  -. 26  --  .4
Ratio of mean relative deviations of
yield and acreage  3.51  2.26  1.90  2.37  --  2.19
Correlation of yield-acreage deviation :  -. 13  -. 31  -. 76  .18  --  -. 36
Sugar:
Mean deviation  :  Million tons  .45  2.52  .29  .65  .65  2.56
Mean  production  :  Million tons  10.61  69.15  5.66  8.38  6.30  79.76j
Mean relative deviation  C[1/21  :  Percent  4.24  3.65  5.08  7.70  10.27  3.21
Correlation  of  deviation  with  EC  :  I  -. 06  -. 26  .42  .13  1
Ratlo'of mean  relative deviations of
yield and  acreage  1.74  .87  .94  5.41  1.98  47
Correlation  of  y ie  ld-acreage  deviation:  -. 10  .63  '-.73  -. 07  -33  33
140Table 2--Variability of beef production in the EC and
selected countries, 1968/69 - 1980/81
Rest
*  Dimension  EC  of  United  USSR
world  States
Mean deviation  :  Million tons  .23  1.24  .62  .23
Mean production  :  Million tons  6.32  31.76  10.60  6.00
Mean relative"
deviation  [1/21  Percent  3.66  3.90  5.83  3.82
Correlation of
deviation:
with EC  :  1  .05  .06  .15
Continued--
141Table 2--Variability of beef production in the EC  and
selected countries,  1968/69 - 1980/81--Continued
Dimension  :Australia  :Argentina  :  New  :World
Zealand  :total
Mean deviation  :  Million tons  .27  .23  .04  1.27
Mean production  : Million tons  2.64  1.51  .41  38.08
Mean relative
deviation  [1/21  :  Percent  10.20  14.92  8.79  3.33
Correlation of  °
deviation:
with  EC.  .00  -.26  -.08  .23
142Table 3-Variability of  grain  and  sugar'  production  in  the  EC  and  selected countries,
1968/69  - 1980/81
s  s:sRest  ss
Item  s Dimension  : EC  :  of  :  United  : USSR  :  Wor ld
sworld  s:States  s:s:total
m(dev  C) /MCC)
m(dev  d  l)





(correl)  between dev Q
and dev C
and  dev dl







































.01  -. 10  .18  1/ -. 10
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.12)Table 4--Coarse grains--Domestic and worldwide  instability absorption,  EC and selected
countries-1968/69,4980/81
Rest
Item  ;  Dimension  : EC  :  of  United  : USSR  :  World
world : States :  :  total
m(dev C)/m(C)  :  Percent  2.08  2.17  6.51  9.12  -2.01
m(dev  dl)  :  Million tons  1.08  9.24  9.02  1.98  8.55
m(dev dl)/m(C+di)  :  Percent  1.46  1.58  6.27  2.17  1.30
m(dev  C+dl)/m(C+dl)  :  Percent  2.49  2.90  7.55  10.05  2.63
m(dev T)  :  Million tons  2.32  2.32  3.12  2.55  1/  2.53
m(dev  T)/m(C+dT)  :  Percent  3.14  .39  2.16  2.79  .38
ratio
(correl) between dev Q
and dev  C  .10  .64  .51  .67  .72
*  (.17)  (.79**)  (-.74**)  (.%**)  (.8**)
and dev dl  .20  .31  .35  .10  .27
(*49*)  (.58*)  (.53*)  (.59*)  (.54*)
and dev T  .69  .03  .13  .19  1/  .03
(.80)  (.23)  (.57*)  (*77**)  (.21)
ratio
(correl)  between  dev QWOrld
and dev C  .03  .68  .28  .26  .72
(.38)  (.84**)  (.51*)  (.55)  (.86**)
and.  dev dl:  .00  .27  .24  .02  .27
(.00)  (.51*)  (.47)  (.23)  (.54*)
and dev  (C+dl)*  .03  .96  .53  .29  I
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I/  World exports.
144Table 5--Sugar:  Domestic and worldwide  instability absorption,  EC and selected countries,  1968/69  - 1980/8
"  .fRest  .
Item  :  Dimension  :  EC  :  of  :  United  : USSR  Cuba  : Worl
world  :  States:total
m(dev C)/m(C)  :  Percent  2.34  2.00  3.77  1.96  11.22  .9
m(dev dl)  :  Million  tons  0.36  1.90  .27  .37  .32  2.1
m(dev dl)/m(C+di)  :  Percent  3.34  2.74  2.66  3.32  54.23  2.6
m(dev  Cdl)/m(C+dl)  :  Percent  3.66  3.44  3.85  4.06  57.96  3.1
m(dev  1)  : Million  tons  .70  .90  .43  .42  .62  1/ .5
m(dev T)/m(C+dT)  :  Percent  6.51  1.30  4.24  3.77  105.08  .7
ratio.
(correl) between dev  Q  "
and dev C  .07  .12  .17  .17  .04  .1
(-.12)  (.25)  (.12)  (.52*)  (.46)  (.3
and dev dl  .001  .75  .58  .47  .21  .7
*  (.00)  (.87**)  (.65**)  (.68**)  (.51*)  (.8
and dev T  1.06  .12  .13  .34  .74  1/ .12
(.77**)  (.34)  (.10)  (.56*)  (.91**)  (.39
ratio"
(correl)  between dev Qw
and dev C  -. 008  .18  -. 006  .01  .005  .18
*(-.08)  (.37)  (-.04)  (.22)  (.20)  (.38
and  dev  dl:  .002  .75  .58  .47  .02.7
(.000)  (.87**)  (.65**)  (.68**)  (.19)  (.83*
and dev  (Cedl)  .04  .88  .05  .12  .02  1





between dev TEC and dev  rest of world exports





I/  World exports.
I45Tabl  6--eef:  Domestic and worldwide instability absorption, EC  and
selected countries, 1968/69-1980/81
Rest
Dimension  :  EC  :  of  :  United  : USSR
world  :  i~~
m(dev C)/m(C)  :  Percent  1.61  4.01  5.40  3.45
m(dev di)  :  Million tons  .07  .05  .02  .05
m(dev dI)/m(C+dI)  :  Percent  1.06  .16..17  .83
m(dev CdI)/m(C+dI)  :  Percent  2.03  4.02  5.40  3.36
m(dev T)  :  Million tons  .16  .20  .07  08
m(dev T)/m(C+41)  :  Percent  2.43  .64  .61  1.33
ratio  i
(carrel) bewe~n  4ev Q
and dev C  .17  .96  1.00  .71
(-.38)  (.98**)  (.99**)  (.89**)
and dev dl  .15  -. 004  .001  .04
(.42)  (.11)  (.03)  (.18)
and  ev T  .68  .04  1.009  .15
(.84**)  (.26)  (-.07)  (.43)
ratio
(correl) between 4ev QV
and  4ev C  -. 01,  .95  -. 43  .06
(-.22)  (.99**)  (_.87**)  (.41)
and  4ev dl  -. 003  .007  .001  -. 01
(.05)  (-.17)  (.08)  (.31)
and  4ev (C+fI):  -.02  .96  .43  .005
*  -.1)(.98**)  (.87**)  (.03)
Continued-
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Table  6--Beef:Table 6--Beef:  Domestic and worldwide instability absorption, EC and
selected countries, 1968/69-1980/81--Continued
Dimension  : Australia  .Argentina  New  :  World
Zealand:  total
m(dev C)/m(C)  :  Percent  8.86  17.78  9.21  3.14
m(dev dl)  :  Million tons  .02  .03.02  .09
m(dev dI)/m(C+dI)  :  Percent  .96  4.00  12.5.23
m(dev C+dI)/m(C+dI)  :  Percent  8.66  20.21  18.21  3.15
m(dev T)  :  Million tons  .12  .13  .03  1/  .15
m(dev T)/m(C+dI)  Percent  5.76  17.33  18.15.39
ratio  i
(correl) between dev Q
and dev C  :  .66  .43  .15  93
"  (.89**)  (.82**)  (.46)  (.99**)
and devdl  -.02  .09  .37  -.01
(-.36)  (.63*)  (.78**)  (-.14)
and dev T  .35  .47  .46  1/ .04
"(.72**).  (.82**)  (.77**)  (.26)
ratio:
(correl) between dev Qw
and dev C.  .08  .08  .007  .93
(.56)  (.92**)  (.62*)  (.99**)
and 4ev dl  .00  .01  .01  -.01
(.04)  (.48*)  (.69)  (-.14)
and 4ev (C+fI)  :  .08  .10  .01  1






between 4ev TEC and dev rest of world exports




1/  World exports.
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